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Critical Policy Studies Transnational discourse coalitions and monetary policy: Argentina and the limited powers of the ''Washington Consensus''

Profile image of Dieter PlehweDieter Plehwe

Abstract

Why, in the era of neoliberalism, Argentinean monetary policymakers rejected the kind of flexible monetary exchange rates recommended by the 'Washington Consensus' remains a puzzle. The literature has mainly contrasted external and internal factors of influence and constraints to explain the country's peculiar road to neoliberalism. In this paper, discourse coalition theory is developed further to more fully capture the transnational configuration of the transnational discourse coalition behind the policy mix chosen under President Menem. In the course of deconstructing the Washington Consensus alliance and reconstructing the particular agents and agencies behind the currency board, apparently contradictory positions turn out to constitute a specific combination of neoliberal agents and agencies that are firmly embedded in the larger universe of the hegemonic discourse coalition of the Washington Consensus era, which has to be considered more heterogeneous than has been recognized by most observers.

Figures (2)
To cite this article: Dieter Plehwe (2011): Transnational discourse coalitions and monetary policy Argentina and the limited powers of the ‘‘Washington Consensus’’, Critical Policy Studies, 5:2, 127-148
To cite this article: Dieter Plehwe (2011): Transnational discourse coalitions and monetary policy Argentina and the limited powers of the ‘‘Washington Consensus’’, Critical Policy Studies, 5:2, 127-148
Source: Adapted from Benegas Lynch, Jr. (1990) and several internet sources Ee ee The Menem turn to neoliberalism resulted from an integration of different political forces in the country at the expense of the traditional base of Peronism. The reorientation of Peronism was orchestrated by Menem’s reliance on Renovadores rather than traditionalists, and by cooptation of the neoliberal opposition. With this, Menem succeeded in integrating the Cordoba and Buenos Aires factions of Argentine neoliberalism. With Cavallo first as foreign minister and Alsogaray as economic advisor (and Alsogaray’s daughter Maria as
Source: Adapted from Benegas Lynch, Jr. (1990) and several internet sources Ee ee The Menem turn to neoliberalism resulted from an integration of different political forces in the country at the expense of the traditional base of Peronism. The reorientation of Peronism was orchestrated by Menem’s reliance on Renovadores rather than traditionalists, and by cooptation of the neoliberal opposition. With this, Menem succeeded in integrating the Cordoba and Buenos Aires factions of Argentine neoliberalism. With Cavallo first as foreign minister and Alsogaray as economic advisor (and Alsogaray’s daughter Maria as

Key takeaways

  • Argentina was the only country in Latin America that introduced a currency board.
  • In order to dive deeper into the transnational dimensions of the domestic history of Argentine neoliberalism in general, and to explain more precisely how Argentina came to rely on a currency board in particular, a discourse coalition approach introduced to advance policy studies will be discussed next (section two).
  • If Cavallo and friends came to share key elements of the neoliberal discourse coalition, early Cordoba neoliberalism entailed a strong element of regional developmentalism, which is crucial to understand Argentina's somewhat uneasy neoliberal discourse coalition of the late 1970s.
  • Ramirez in this case fails to recognize the specific transnational discourse coalition behind the currency board.
  • The neoliberal discourse coalition has certainly transformed both policies and politics in Argentina.

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