The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

II. The Scope of Jurisdiction of the International Tribunal

A. Territorial and Temporal Jurisdiction

In establishing the International Tribunal under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter for the purpose, inter alia, of restoring peace and security in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council has created an organ of limited duration and scope of jurisdiction. As a form of Chapter VII enforcement measure, the Tribunal's jurisdiction could not have extended beyond the territorial bounds of the former Yugoslavia,⁸ nor could it extend in time, beyond the restoration of peace and security as eventually to be determined by the Security Council.

The temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal extends, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), to the period beginning in 1991, and is fixed, by Article 8 of the Statute, to begin on 1 January of that year. In the search for a specific date within the general reference to 1991, three dates were considered, each referring to a specific event to which the beginning of the dissolution process of the former Yugoslavia could have been attributed: 25 June 1991 - the proclamation of independence by Croatia and Slovenia; 27 June 1991 - the intervention of the Federal Army in Slovenia, and 3 July 1991 - the outbreak of clashes between Serbian and Croatian militia.⁹ The Secretary-General opted, however, for a neutral date which would not carry with it any political connotation as to the international or internal character of the conflict, with the legal implications that such a determination would have entailed for the choice of the applicable law. In addition, information made available by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), suggested that crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal might have been committed against Serbian populations before June 1991.¹⁰ The choice of 1 January 1991 was, therefore, intended to embrace all crimes by whomsoever committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, and to convey an image of complete neutrality and impartiality in the Yugoslav conflict.

B. Subject-matter Jurisdiction

The establishment of the Tribunal under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter delimited not only its territorial and temporal jurisdiction, but also circumscribed the scope of its subject-matter jurisdiction and imposed strict criteria on the choice of the applicable law. The fact that the Security Council is not a legislative body mandated that the subsidiary organ it created would not be endowed with competence the parent body did not have. Likewise it could not be seen as creating a new international law binding upon the parties to the conflict.

The Tribunal was, accordingly, empowered to apply only those provisions of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary international law, irrespective of their codification in any international instrument, and regardless of whether the State or States in question had adhered to them and duly incorporated their provisions into their national legislation. The list of international humanitarian law violations that are of an undoubtedly customary international law nature, was further limited to those which have customarily entailed the criminal liability of the individual, and includes, according to Articles 2 to 5 of the Statute: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity.

1. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions

The `grave breaches' of the four Geneva Conventions¹¹ are set out in common Articles 50/51/130/147, and are reproduced in Article 2 of the Statute. They include any of the following acts, when committed against persons or property protected under the Conventions:¹² wilful killing, torture and inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, extensive destruction or appropriation of property not justified by military necessity, compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power, wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial, unlawful deprivation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian, and the taking of civilians as hostages.

Unlike breaches of the Geneva Conventions, in respect of which the High Contracting Parties undertake an obligation to suppress them, grave breaches entail an additional obligation to prosecute and try persons alleged to have committed or to have ordered the commission of the crimes, regardless of their nationality, before their courts or the courts of other States. `Grave breaches' thus entail for the perpetrator of the crime an individual criminal liability irrespective of the responsibility of the State of which he is a national.

Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977 (hereinafter Protocol I), supplements the list of `grave breaches' established in the Conventions, and extends the application of the repression system i.e., the establishment of universal criminal jurisdiction, to new categories of persons and objects protected under the Protocol.<sup>13</sup> Given, however, the undisputed customary international law nature of the Geneva Conventions, recourse has been had to the list of `grave breaches' enumerated therein, and not to the one established in Protocol I. The latter, notwithstanding the customary law nature of most of its provisions, was, as a whole, not yet qualified as indubitably part of customary international law.¹⁴

2. Violations of the Laws or Customs of War

The catalogue of war crimes established in Article 3 of the Statute draws upon the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,¹⁵ as re-affirmed in the Nuremberg Charter¹⁶ and the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.¹⁷ It includes the use of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering (Regulation 23(a) and (e)); the wanton destruction and devastation of cities not justified by military necessity (Regulation 23(g) and Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter); attack, or bombardment of undefended towns (Regulation 25) the seizure of or destruction and damage to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education, historic monuments or works of art and science (Regulation 56) and the plunder of public or private property (Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter).

The customary international law nature of the Hague Regulations, and the characterization of violations thereof as war crimes entailing the individual criminal liability of the perpetrator, were firmly established by the Nuremberg Tribunal. In rejecting the argument that the Hague Convention applied in the relationship between its Contracting Parties only,¹⁸ the Tribunal held that although the rules of land warfare represented an advance over existing international law at the time of their adoption, by 1939, these rules were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war.¹⁹

As for the individual criminal liability they entail, the Tribunal added that methods of land warfare prohibited under the Hague Convention, such as the inhumane treatment of prisoners, the employment of poisoned weapons, the improper use of flags of truce, and similar matters, `had been enforced long before the date of the Convention; but since 1907 they have certainly been crimes, punishable as offences against the laws of war'.²⁰ In an oft-quoted passage, the Tribunal held:

With respect to war crimes, however ... the crimes defined by Article 6, section (b), of the Charter were already recognized as war crimes under international law. They were covered by Articles 46, 50, 52, and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907... That violation of these provisions constituted crimes for which the guilty individuals were punishable is too well settled to admit of argument.²¹

Although the list of war crimes contained in Article 3 of the Statute is limited, it is, as clearly indicated in the chapeau to the Article, by no means exhaustive. Other violations of the laws and customs of war, which under customary international law have been recognized as war crimes entailing the criminal liability of the individual, may equally be determined by the Tribunal to fall within its subject-matter jurisdiction.²²

3. Crimes against Humanity

Article 5 of the Statute reproduces Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter and Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 for Germany.²³ As part of the Nuremberg Charter, recognized as `the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation',²⁴ Article 6(c) still represents the only authoritative definition of crimes against humanity. Article 5 of the Statute, accordingly, includes the crimes of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds and other inhumane acts, when committed in an armed conflict, whether international or national in character, and directed against any civilian population.²⁵

One of the most notorious crimes committed in the Yugoslav conflict, the practice of so-called `ethnic cleansing', is not referred to, as such, in the Statute. `Ethnic cleansing', a new name for an old crime, is embraced by the grave breach of `unlawful deportation or transfer ... of a civilian', or the crime of `deportation' of civilian population under Article 5 of the Statute.²⁶ To the extent that `ethnic cleansing' also comprises murder, extermination, rape etc. it is covered under the respective crimes, characterized as either war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Article 5 of the Statute deviates from Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter²⁷ in that it breaks the nexus - established in the Charter and subsequently abandoned in Control Council Law No. 10²⁸ - between the commission of crimes against humanity and the execution of war crimes and crimes against peace. It preserves, however, the link between crimes against humanity and the existence of `an armed conflict whether international or national in character'. Unlike Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, Article 5 of the Statute does not extend to the period `before the war'.²⁹ In the Yugoslav context, it was considered unnecessary to refer to the period `before the war' as the entire period falling within the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal, namely, since 1 January 1991, is one which may either be characterized as an international or an internal conflict. The Statute did not decide, however, the question, still debated, of whether crimes against humanity can be committed in times of peace.

4. The Crime of Genocide

Genocide, as a specific case of crimes against humanity (`extermination'), may be committed both in times of peace and of war. However, unlike the crime of `extermination' of civilian populations committed in time of war, genocide targets a specifically designated group within the civilian population, distinguished on national, ethnic, racial or religious grounds, with an intent to destroy that group as such, and `because of its existence and character as a coherent community'.³⁰ Genocide embraces acts which, although in themselves are short of physical or biological destruction, lead to the liquidation of the group, as a whole. According to Article 4 of the Statute, which replicates Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948³¹ (hereinafter Genocide Convention), genocide consists of any of the following acts, when committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The International Court of Justice affirmed in the case of Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, that the principles underlying the Convention `are principles which are recognized by civilized nations and binding on States, even without any conventional obligation'.³² This affirmation applies both to the definition of the crime and to the individual criminal liability it entails.³³ The individual criminal liability for the crime of genocide does not, however, exclude the responsibility which may, independently thereof, be imputed to the State.³⁴ In the Yugoslav context, the crime of genocide could conceivably be the subject of parallel and simultaneous legal proceedings before the International Tribunal and the International Court of Justice, entailing, respectively, the individual criminal liability of the perpetrator, and the responsibility of the State of which he is the agent or the organ. Indeed, the International Court of Justice has already been seized with an Application of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina instituting proceedings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in respect of a dispute concerning alleged violations by Yugoslavia of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.³⁵

C. Personal Jurisdiction and the Principles of Criminal Liability

Article 6 of the Statute provides that the International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons. All persons are, therefore, subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal, with the exclusion of legal persons, organizations and States. The possibility of extending the personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal to organizations for the purpose of establishing membership thereof as an offence, was discarded. The Nuremberg precedent, whereby a declaration of criminality of an organization by the Military Tribunal fixed the criminality of its members in Subsequent Proceedings before national courts of the signatory Parties,³⁶ could not have been followed in the Yugoslav context. This was not only because a similar hierarchical structure between the International Tribunal and national courts could not have been envisaged, but mainly because the notion of guilt by association, implicit in the crime of membership, does not comport with the underlying principle of the Statute that criminal liability is personal.³⁷

Individual criminal responsibility is attributed, under Article 7 of the Statute, to any person accused of planning, instigating, ordering or committing a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether as a principal or as an accomplice.³⁸ It is designed to embrace all perpetrators along the chain of command, from the level of policy decision-makers to the rank-and-file level of soldiers, paramilitary, or civilians. Article 7 of the Statute thus entails the liability of those who ordered the commission of the crime, of those who only knew or could have known of it but failed to prevent or repress it, when in a position and under a duty to do so, and of those who physically committed the crime. Pleas of `Head-of-State' immunity or obedience to superior orders are excluded as a defence, although the latter is permitted as mitigating punishment.³⁹

In attributing individual criminal liability to the head of State and to the perpetrator of the crime in carrying out superior orders, the Statute follows almost literally the Nuremberg Charter. However, in attributing criminal responsibility to a superior for acts of his subordinates,⁴⁰ the Statute reflects the customary international law rule of `command responsibility', as it has developed since post World-War II trials, and most notably the Yamashita trial. Its conceptual basis is attributed to Article 1 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention, which provides that a condition for the applicability of the laws and customs of war to militia or volunteer corps is that the latter are `commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates'. Since the landmark case of General Yamashita⁴¹ - the Japanese commander in the Philippines who was sentenced to death by the United States Military Commission for failing to prevent troops under his overall command from committing widespread crimes - the principle of `command responsibility' has been incorporated in the national military legislation of States and reaffirmed in a series of international and national judicial decisions - the My Lai⁴² and the Sabra and Shatila⁴³ cases are but a few of the most notable examples.⁴⁴

D. Concurrent Jurisdiction, the Primacy of the International Tribunal and the Principle of Non-bis-in-idem

The power of the International Tribunal and that of national courts to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, under the Statute and national legislation, respectively, created a potential conflict of jurisdictions. In the choice between exclusive jurisdiction of the International Tribunal and concurrent jurisdiction of the Tribunal and national courts, including, in particular, those of the former Yugoslavia, considerations of law and practicality militated in favour of the latter. As a matter of law, it was a recognition of the judicial sovereignty of States and their universal jurisdiction in respect of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide. As a matter of practicality, concurrent jurisdiction was a necessity, given the magnitude of crimes committed and the large number of potential war criminals.⁴⁵

Concurrent jurisdiction of the International Tribunal and national courts in matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, does not, however, imply equality of jurisdictions. Rather, given that the objectivity and impartiality of the judicial systems of the parties to the conflict are seriously in doubt, the concurrent jurisdiction of the national courts is subject to the primacy of the International Tribunal. In exercising its primacy over national courts, the International Tribunal is empowered to intervene at any stage of the proceedings, including the investigation stage, and request that national authorities or courts defer to the competence of the Tribunal.⁴⁶ The grounds for intervention and the procedure by which deferral may be requested were left to be elaborated in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal. However, Members of the Security Council indicated upon the adoption of Resolution 827 that intervention in legal proceedings before national courts would only be appropriate in situations covered under Article 10(2) of the Statute, namely, to guarantee the objectivity and impartiality of national courts when trying persons responsible for crimes under the Statute, and to ensure that judicial proceedings in national courts are not instituted with the sole purpose of obstructing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or otherwise shielding the accused from international criminal responsibility.⁴⁷

The procedure for requesting a deferral of legal proceedings is set out in Rules 8 to 11 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter sometimes Rules of Procedure).⁴⁸ The grounds for the request, stipulated in Rule 9, include the characterization of the act for which a person is tried before the national court as an ordinary crime, the partiality of the court and its lack of independence, and situations where the case investigated or tried before a national court is closely related to, or might otherwise have significant implications for the investigation or prosecution of other persons before the Tribunal. Upon receipt of information regarding any investigation or proceedings instituted in a national court for a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and which may suggest that any or all of the grounds stipulated in Rule 9 exist, the Prosecutor may ask the President to formally request a deferral for the competence of the Tribunal; a request which shall be assigned by the President to a Trial Chamber for decision. If convinced of the existence of such grounds, the Trial Chamber shall issue an order for a deferral along with a request that the results of the investigation and a copy of the court's records and the judgment, if delivered, be forwarded to the Tribunal.⁴⁹

The concept of concurrent jurisdiction raises the issue of double jeopardy of an accused, and the risk of being tried twice for the same offence before two different jurisdictions. Given the primacy of the International Tribunal, the principle of non-bis-in-idem (no one shall be tried or punished twice) does not apply equally to both jurisdictions in a manner which would bar subsequent prosecution by any one jurisdiction following a conviction or acquittal by the other. Rather, under Article 10 of the Statute, the principle of non-bis-in-idem only bars subsequent prosecution before national courts, following a conviction or acquittal by the International Tribunal. It does not bar a subsequent prosecution before the Tribunal, if the act for which the person was accused before the national court was characterized as an ordinary crime, or where the national court proceedings were not impartial, independent, or were otherwise designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility.

E. Cooperation of States, Judicial Assistance and National Legislation

The obligation to cooperate with the International Tribunal and give effect to its requests for judicial assistance, including, where necessary, the adoption of implementing legislation, is implicit in the general obligation of States to give effect to Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.⁵⁰ It is explicitly provided for in paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), and is further specified in Article 29 of the Statute.⁵¹

Compliance with the Tribunal's requests for the identification or location of persons, the taking of testimony, the service of documents, the carrying out of on-site investigation and the arrest of suspects and accused would be effectuated in the territories of the cooperating States in accordance with their national legislation. It is, indeed, the underlying assumption of Rules 55 and 56 of the Rules of Procedure which provide that a warrant for the arrest of the accused and his transfer to the Tribunal shall be transmitted to the national authorities of the State in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or control the accused resides, and that a State to which such warrant has been transmitted shall ensure execution in accordance with Article 29 of the Statute.

The obligation to give effect to the Tribunal's orders, summons and warrants of arrest would, however, necessitate in most countries implementing legislation to authorize, within their national territories, enforcement measures which would otherwise not be permitted.⁵² Thus, a request of the Tribunal for the surrender of the accused would be considered in most national legislation, unless modified, a request for extradition, which, as such, may be refused on grounds of nationality of the accused.⁵³

Similarly, requests for stay or deferral of proceedings to the Tribunal's competence, or recognition that the Tribunal's judgment is a bar to subsequent prosecution or retrial before national courts, impose serious limitations on States' judicial sovereignty and likewise require implementing legislation.⁵⁴ In the case of the host country or of countries through which territories suspects or accused transit on their way to the Tribunal, the obligation to give effect to surrender orders, would entail for these countries a limitation on the exercise of their universal jurisdiction. A provision, similar to that introduced in the draft Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the Netherlands, granting `safe conduct' or `immunity from prosecution' to suspects or accused, while `en route' to the Tribunal, would in many transit countries be necessary.⁵⁵ And finally, introduction or modification of legislation would be necessary in order to give effect to enforcement of prison sentences - once the State concerned has indicated to the Security Council its willingness to accept convicted persons.⁵⁶

8 Article 8 of the Statute.

9 Letter from the Permanent Representative of France to the Secretary-General, 10 February 1993, UN Doc. S/25266 (1993), paras. 77-81 (hereinafter French Letter).

10 Letter from the charg� d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General, 15 March 1993, UN Doc. S/25421 (1993) 16, 17, 30, 34.

11 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (hereinafter First Geneva Convention); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287.

12 Namely, wounded, sick and members of medical personnel, prisoners of war and civilians in the hands of the adverse power, hospitals, medical equipment and ships, and civilian movable and immovable property in occupied territory.

13 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977 (Protocol I), 1125 UNTS 3, 11-12 and 41-42 (Arts. 11 and 85).

14 For this reason, the perfidious use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other protective signs, which is a newly-added `grave breach' under Protocol I (Article 85, paragraph 3(f)), was not included in the list of `grave breaches' contained in Article 2 of the Statute. This, notwithstanding the fact that Article 53 of the First Geneva Convention recognized the unauthorized use of the `Red Cross' or the `Geneva Cross' or any designation thereof, as a breach of the Convention. On the legal status of the two Additional Protocols, see Abi-Saab, `The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law. Some Preliminary Reflections', in A.J.M. Delissen and G.J. Tanja (eds), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict; Challenges Ahead (1991) 115.

15 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (1915) 100; 1 Ch. I. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949, 643 (hereinafter Bevans).

16 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 280 (hereinafter Nuremberg Charter).

17 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Opinion and Judgment (1947) (hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment).

18 Article 2 of the Hague Convention (IV) provides as follows:
`The provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in Article 1, as well as in the present Convention, do not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.'

19 Nuremberg Judgment, 83.

20 Ibid., 50.

21 Ibid., 83.

22 In its interpretative statement upon the adoption of Security Council Resolution 827(1993), the US delegate declared that the `laws and customs of war' in Article 3 of the Statute refer to `all obligations under humanitarian law agreements in force in the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the time the acts were committed, including Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 Additional Protocols to these Conventions' (emphasis added). (UNSC, Provisional Verbatim Record, 3217 mtg. UN Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993) 15) (hereinafter Verbatim Record). Article 3 of the Statute contains, however, provisions which meet the cumulative criteria of undisputed customary international law nature, and of individual criminal liability, and although common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions represents a customary international law standard of minimum human conduct applicable in internal armed conflict, it does not entail, under the Geneva Conventions, the individual criminal liability of the perpetrator of the crime. The Article prohibits violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, cruel treatment and torture, taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, humiliating and degrading treatment, and the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execution without previous judgment, pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees. Note, however, that the crimes of murder, torture and the taking of hostages are also crimes against humanity, which under Article 5 of the Statute, may be committed in an armed conflict whether international or internal in character.

23 Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, 22; reprinted in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (1946-1949) 23, 24-25.

24 Nuremberg Judgment, 48.

25 Upon the adoption of Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), representatives of France, the US and Russia expressed their understanding that Article 5 applies to all acts listed therein when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds (Verbatim Record, 11, 16, 45, respectively). Although not expressly provided for in Article 5 of the Statute, the mass scale and widespread nature of the crimes is implicit in the notion of `attack against civilian population' which envisages a plurality of authors and victims of crimes, and is explicitly referred to in paragraph 48 of the Secretary-General's Report.

26 In its Interim Report, the Commission of Experts established by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780(1992) to analyse and examine information relating to evidence of war crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, defined the expression `ethnic cleansing' to mean `rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area'. The Commission furthermore noted that:
`Based on the many reports received describing the policy and practices conducted in the former Yugoslavia ... "ethnic cleansing" has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property... These practices constitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore ... such acts could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.'
Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780(1992), UNSC, UN Doc. S/25274 (1993), Annex I, para. 56.

27 See also Article 5(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946, 4 Bevans 20, 22 (hereinafter Tokyo Charter).

28 Article II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10.

29 Under Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, crimes against humanity could be committed before or during the war, provided they were committed in execution of or in connection with war crimes or crimes against peace. The difficulty of proving that crimes against humanity committed before the war, and therefore in time of peace, were committed in execution of or in connection with war crimes or crimes against peace is well illustrated in the Nuremberg Judgment, where the Tribunal found that the murder of political opponents, the policy of vast-scale, systematic and organized terror, persecution, repression and murder of civilians, and the persecution of Jews before 1 September 1939, did not constitute crimes against humanity within the meaning of the Charter, as `[T]he Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in connection with any such crime' (Nuremberg Judgment, 84).

30 Shaw, `Genocide and International Law', in Y. Dinstein (ed.), International Law at a Time of Perplexity, Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (1989) 805.

31 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 278.

32 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ Reports (1951) 23 (Advisory Opinion of May 28).

33 Article IV of the Genocide Convention stipulates that:
`Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.'

34 Shaw, supra note 28, at 813-814.

35 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), (Order of 8 April 1993), ICJ Reports (1993) 3; (Order of 13 September 1993), ibid. 325.

36 Articles 9 and 10 of the Nuremberg Charter, and Article 5 of the Tokyo Charter.

37 For these reasons, both New Zealand and Belgium in their submissions to the Secretary-General expressed opposition to including membership in criminal organization as an offence under the Statute (Letter from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the Secretary-General, 25 March 1993 (on file with authors) (hereinafter New Zealand Letter), and Observations du Gouvernement Belge au sujet de la creation d'un Tribunal International ad hoc pour juger les violations graves du droit humanitaire international commises dans l'ex-Yougoslavie, 23 March 1993 (on file with authors). The French Letter provided, however, that membership in a de jure or de facto group whose primary or subordinate goal is to commit crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal would constitute a specific offence (French Letter, para. 92, and Article VII, para 2, of the `Possible provisions for the Statute of the Tribunal', 63).

38 The Statute does not retain the notion of `conspiracy' which was recognized by the Nuremberg Tribunal as a specific offence only in relation to crimes against peace (Nuremberg Judgment, 56). Conspiracy, or the participation in a common plan to commit a crime, entails the criminal responsibility of any individual who participated in the common plan for any acts done by other members of that group in carrying out the collective decision. Premised on the principle of individual criminal liability, the Statute retains the notion of complicity which entails the individual criminal responsibility of the accused for acts done by him to the extent of his contribution to the execution of the crime. See, Principle VII of the Nuremberg Principles (Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, II Yearbook of the ILC (1950) 374, 377; Wright, `The Law of the Nuremberg Trial', 41 AJIL (1947) 38, 67-70.

39 Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Statute reproduces Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter and allows for a plea of `obedience to superior orders' as mitigating punishment only. It thus reflects the restrictive approach adopted by the Nuremberg Tribunal which held that:
`The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible' (Nuremberg Judgment, 53-54).
`Obedience to superior orders' is therefore excluded as defence, regardless of the state of knowledge of the perpetrator of the crime as to the legality of the order. See, however, the interpretative statement of the US delegate recognizing lack of knowledge of the illegality of an order, as defence (UNSC, Verbatim Record, 16); see generally, Y. Dinstein, The Defence of `Obedience to Superior Orders' in International Law (1965) 21-37, 147-156, 160-214.

40 Article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute.

41 Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, United Nations War Crimes Commission, 4 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (1948) 1; affirmed, In Re Yamashita, 327 US 1 (1945).

42 US v. Medina, 20 USCMA 403, 43 CMR 243 (1971).

43 Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, 7 February 1983, 22 ILM (1983) 473.

44 See generally M. Ch. Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1992) 372-392; Green, `Superior Orders and Command Responsibility', 27 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. (1989) 167; Green, `War Crimes, Extradition and Command Responsibility', 14 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1984) 17, 33-53; Paust, `My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility', 57 Military Law Review (1972) 99; Parks, `Command Responsibility for War Crimes', 62 Military Law Review (1973) 1. In their submissions to the Secretary-General, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States proposed the inclusion of `command responsibility' in the principles of criminal liability. (Letter from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the Secretary-General, 13 April 1993, UN Doc. S/25594 (1993) para. 12 (hereinafter Canadian Letter); Letter from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the Secretary-General, 16 February 1993, UN Doc. S/25300 (1993) Art. 5(3) of the proposed Statute (hereinafter Italian Letter); Note Verbale from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Secretary-General, 30 April 1993, UN Doc. S/25716 (1993) 4 (hereinafter Netherlands Note); Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the Secretary-General, 5 April 1993, UN Doc. S/25575 (1993) Annex II, Art. 11(b) (hereinafter US Letter).

45 Paragraph 64 of the Secretary-General's Report provides:
`... [I]t was not the intention of the Security Council to preclude or prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts with respect to such acts. Indeed national courts should be encouraged to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with their relevant national laws and procedures.'

46 Article 9 of the Statute.

47 Statements by France, United States and the United Kingdom, UNSC, Verbatim Record, 11, 16, 18-19, respectively.

48 Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Adopted on 11 February 1994), UN Doc. IT/32 (1994), reprinted in 33 ILM (1994) 493 (hereinafter Rules of Procedure).

49 Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure.

50 Paragraph 126 of the Secretary-General's Report provides as follows:
`... an order by a Trial Chamber for the surrender or transfer of persons to the custody of the International Tribunal shall be considered to be the application of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations'.

51 On 2 June 1993, shortly after Resolution 827 (1993) was adopted, the Secretary-General addressed a note to all member States, drawing their particular attention to their obligations under paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 827, to cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs, and to `take any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 29 of the Statute' (Note SCA/8/93(7), 2 June 1993 (on file with authors)); Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure provides:
`The obligations laid down in Article 29 of the Statute prevail over any legal impediment to the surrender or transfer of the accused to the Tribunal which may exist under the national law or extradition treaties of the State concerned.'

52 Italy was the first to enact implementing legislation. Article 11 of the Italian Decree-Law No. 544 of 28 December 1993 on Provisions in the matter of cooperation with the International Tribunal for the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as modified by Law No. 120 of 14 February 1994, establishes the procedure for complying with requests of the Tribunal for surrender of accused. Accordingly, a request emanating from the Tribunal should be submitted by the procuratore generale to the Court of Appeal, whose decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Cassation. The final decision on the surrender rests with the Minister of Justice. Surrender to the Tribunal may be refused on any of the following grounds: (a) the Tribunal has not issued a warrant of arrest; (b) the identity of the accused has not been established; (c) the fact for which the surrender is requested does not fall within the temporal and territorial jurisdiction of the International Tribunal; (d) the facts for which surrender is requested do not constitute a crime under Italian law, and (e) a final judgment was entered against the person for the same facts (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Republica Italiana, serie generale, No. 43, 22 February 1994, at 48). Whereas the first two conditions state the obvious, the third raises the question of the competence of a national court to pass judgment or otherwise determine the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the last two conditions are inconsistent with the Statute and the principle of the primacy of the Tribunal. Article 6 of the Spanish Organization Act 15/1994 of 1 June on Cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, foresees a simplified procedure for complying with requests of the Tribunal for surrender of accused without the need for formal extradition proceedings. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the Secretary-General, 25 July 1994, UN Doc. A/49/278, S/1994/876 (1994), Annex.

53 This, indeed, has been the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which announced its refusal to extradite its own citizens without modification of its constitution (Declaration of M. Mitic, Representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) on 14 August 1993, CERD/C/SR 1004, paragraph 57). National legislation cannot, however, be relied upon for refusal to surrender, not only because requests for surrender emanating from the Tribunal are binding on the State under Chapter VII of the Charter and thus override any national legislation, but mainly because surrender of an accused to the Tribunal cannot be equated with extradition to a State pursuant to an extradition treaty and in the context of judicial inter-State cooperation.

54 Article 3 of the Italian Decree-Law provides that proceedings be deferred to the Tribunal's competence if the following two conditions are met:
`a. [that] the International Tribunal is proceeding for the same fact for which the Italian judge is proceeding;
b. [that] the International Tribunal has territorial and temporal jurisdiction over said fact, under Article 8 of the Statute.'
Similarly, see Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Spanish Law.

55 Article XXI, paragraph 1, of the draft Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the Netherlands Concerning the International Tribunal provides as follows:
`The host country shall not exercise its criminal jurisdiction over persons present in its territory, who are to be or have been transferred as a suspect or an accused to the premises of the Tribunal pursuant to a request or an order of the Tribunal, in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to their entry into the territory of the host country (on file with authors).' Article 7, paragraph 4 of the Spanish Law provides that:
`Spain shall guarantee the immunity of persons in transit for the purpose of appearing before the International Tribunal.'
See also Article 10 of the Dutch draft bill containing provisions relating to the establishment of the International Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, in Council of Europe, European Committee on Crimes Problems (CDPC), Exchange of views of experts on the repercussions on international legal co-operation and domestic law of the creation of the `International Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia' (CDPC Doc./Exch.Inf.Int.Trib(93)1), and the informal views expressed by delegations from Switzerland, France, Hungary, Austria, Portugal, Spain, UK and Germany in the Council of Europe, European Committee on Crimes Problems, 42nd. plenary session, 7-11 June 1993, see CDPC Doc. Exch.Inf.Int.Trib.(93) 2-9.

56 Paragraph 122 of the Secretary-General's Report, Article 27 of the Statute.

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